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PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT SE7TLEMEN TS: FAULTLINES

It takes a thousand men to invent a telegraph, or a steam engine, or a
phonograph, or a photograph, or a telephone, or any other Important thing
- and the last man gets the credit and we forget the others. He added his
little mite - that is all he did.
-

Mark Twain'
I. INTRODUCTION

As America ages,2 pharmaceutical sales are increasing dramatically
each year. Major blockbuster drug patents are expiring,4 and generic rivals
are flooding the market.5 As consumers struggle to afford lifesaving
medications, political pressure continues to mount for the importation of
cheaper Canadian drugs,6 and the battle for market control by large brand
name manufacturers is galvanizing into epic legal battles.7
Courts and commentators have long recognized the inherent conflict
between the exclusionary rights conferred by intellectual property laws
and the antitrust condemnation of restraints on trade.' Despite this tension,
1.

NELLA BRADDY HENNEY & ANNE SULLIVAN MACY, THE STORY OF HELEN KELLER

162

(1933).
2. Sophie M. Korczyk, Back to Which Future: The US. Aging Crisis Revisited, at 1,
available at http://assets.aarp.org/ rgcenter/econ/2002_1 8_aging.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2006).
"The U.S. Bureau ofthe Census projects that the [U.S.] population under age 65 will grow by about
35 million between 2002 and 2030," and significantly, that during the same period the U.S.
population over age 65 will grow by the same amount. Id.
3. See Katherine Levit et al., Inflation Spurs Health Spending in 2000,21 HEALTH AFF. 172
(2002). Between 1993 and 2000, prescription drug-spending increased at a rate of 13% annually.
Id. at 174.
4. How IncreasedCompetition From GenericDrugs HasAffected PricesandReturnsin the
PharmaceuticalIndustry, Congressional Budget Office Study, July 1998 [hereinafter CBO Study],
available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=655& sequence=0 (last visited Apr. 28,
2006). See also Amy Barrett, Crunch Time in PillLand, Bus. WK., Nov. 22, 1999, at 52.
5. See, e.g., Chris Adams & Gardiner Harris, Drug Firms Face GrowingPressure Over
Extensions of Their Patents,WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2002 (stating that generic market share has risen
from 19% in 1984 to 49% in 2003), available at http://www.chelationtherapyonline.com
/technical/pl 5.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
6. Shawna L. Woodward, Will PriceControl Legislation SatisfactorilyAddress the Issue
of High PrescriptionDrug Prices?: Several States Are Waiting in the Balancefor PHRMA v.
Concannon, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 169, 169-70 (2002) (discussing the Maine prescription drug
program and the growing outcry for legalizing the importation of Canadian drugs).
7. See Adams & Harris, supranote 5.
8. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455
U.S. 1016 (1982) ("[T]he patent and antitrust laws necessarily clash."); see also Image Technical
Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997) ("At the border of intellectual
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both legal spheres share the common purpose of promoting innovation and
enhancing consumer welfare.9 These competing policy objectives often
clash, upsetting the precarious balance between the two spheres of law,
like shifting tectonic plates building pressure. Recently, the old rift has
erupted anew. The Hatch-Waxman Act, aimed at promoting
pharmaceutical competition and reducing the price of drugs for consumers,
had the unintended effect of increasing litigation settlements among
competitors. 0 Name brand manufacturers prefer to freeze-out their generic
rivals by entering into hefty settlements, rather than resigning the fate of
their monopolies to prolonged and uncertain litigation. In Valley Drug Co.
v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals,Inc." and In re Cardizem CD Antitrust
Litigation,12 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals split on the applicable standard of review for the legality
of these patent settlements. Concerned with consumer welfare, the Sixth
Circuit held that the settlement agreements were per se illegal restraints on
trade. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, explaining that the
Sixth Circuit failed to take into account the exclusionary rights of the
patent holder.
This Article will argue that a new standard is needed for the
examination of settlements between name brand manufacturers and their
generic rivals. These arrangements are neither horizontal restraints
between competitors at the same level of the supply-chain, nor vertical
restraints between suppliers and distributors, but a new diagonal restraint
between generic competitors who are dependent upon their name brand
rivals for important research and development. 3 Legal interpretation of

property monopolies and antitrust markets lies a field of dissonance yet to be harmonized by statute
or the Supreme Court.").
9. Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From
Separate Spheres to Unified Field,66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 167 (1997).
10. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in sections of 15 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 35
U.S.C. (2003)).
11. 344 F.3d 1294 (1 Ith Cir. 2003).
12. 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
13. See Boston Consulting Group, Sustaining Innovation, in U.S. PHARMACEUTICALS:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND THE ROLE OF PATENTS 35-36 (1996), cited in
Delivering on the Promise of PharmaceuticalInnovation: The Need to Maintain Strong and
PredictableIntellectualProperty Rights, PHRMA WHITE PAPER, at 8 (Apr. 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/phrma02O422.pdf (last visited Mar. 5,
2006). This study estimated that the cost of research and development for a single new drug would
be between $500-$600 million. A more recent study estimated the cost of research and development
through the clinical trial phase at $802 million in 2000 dollars. Tufts Center for the Study of Drug
Development, Post-ApprovalR&DRaises TotalDrugDevelopment Costs to $897 Million, Impact
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these diagonal restraint agreements should give greater flexibility to name
brand manufacturers in protecting their intellectual property, while
simultaneously assuring generic rivals incentives to innovate and to
produce cheap substitutes, spurring competition in the market place. To
meet both of these goals, courts will need to return to a modified rule of
reason analysis. The Federal Circuit must take the lead in creating
manageable standards that allow parties to forecast the strength of their
litigation positions with reasonable certainty, thus leading to increased
private resolution of costly patent infringement claims.
Part II of this Article will discuss the legislative and regulatory
framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act as it has developed, and will give
a background on patent infringement lawsuit settlements. Part HI will
explain the antitrust laws which give rise to the split of authority regarding
which standard of review is applicable to patent settlement agreements.
Part IV will focus on the two cases giving rise to the split between the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
over the proper standard of review to apply to these agreements. Part V
will explain the complex diagonal nature of restraints which cross the rift

Study, May/June 2004, Vol. 6. No. 3, at 1 [hereinafter Tufts Study], available at http://csdd.tufts.
edu/InfoServices/ImpactReportPDFs/ImpactReportSummaryMayJune2003.pdf (last visited June
1, 2004). Another study estimated that it takes 12-15 years to develop a new drug and that only 5
out of 5,000 drugs reach the clinical testing stage, and only 1 of those is approved for patient use.
See Pharmaceutical Industry Profile (PhRMA), available at http://www.phrma.org/publications/
publications/brochure/questions/questions.pdf (last visited May 24,2004). Determining the actual
cost of bringing new drugs through the clinical trial phase is contentious, with the pharmaceutical
lobby defending the high figures produced by its studies and consumer advocacy groups
challenging the numbers. Robert Pear, Research Cost for New Drugs Said to Soar, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2001, at CI col. 5. Alan Holmer, president of the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers Association, a trade association for drug makers, said the Tufts Study confirmed that
"drug development is staggeringly expensive," and that it "underscored the need" for patent
protection laws to boost investment in drug development. Id. In opposition, Sidney Wolfe, director
of the Health Research Group at Public Citizen, a consumer advocacy group founded by Ralph
Nader, criticized the study as "just a thinly disguised advertisement for the pharmaceutical industry
to justify continued price-gouging." Id. Clay O'Dell, a spokesperson for the Generic
Pharmaceutical Association, said that "the methodology of this study is suspect. It ignores the fact
that some of the drug development costs are tax deductible and that some of the research is
subsidized by the government through the National Institute of Health." Id. Pear pointed out that
studies by the Tufts center have been a continuing item of debate on the floors of Congress in
debates over drug costs, patent law, and proposals on health policy. Id. For instance, Senator Ron
Wyden, Democrat of Oregon, cited the study as a reason to include prescription drugs in Medicare
coverage, and Representative Henry A. Waxman, Democrat of California, said, "The basic problem
is that all pharmaceutical costs, including research, are in a black box, hidden from view. There
is no transparency. That's the cause of all the skepticism regarding drug research costs and pricing."
Pear, supra note 13, at C I col. 5.
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between the patent and antitrust regimes, and will conclude by suggesting
that the rule of reason is the proper bridge over that divide.
II. PATENT SETTLEMENTS: PURPOSE, POLICY,
ENFORCEMENT, AND MODIFICATION

A. Hatch-Waxman Agreements
14
In 1962, amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) required for the first time that brand name companies prove the
efficacy of a new drug through tests on humans ("clinical trials") when
submitting a New Drug Application (NDA). Generic manufacturers
seeking to market a generic knock-off of the brand name drug were subject
to the same requirement. Generic companies could not afford to conduct
these expensive tests, particularly without any guarantee that they would
be able to capture market share. As a result, by 1984, no generic rival had
emerged for over 150 brand name drugs whose patents had expired.15
To make matters even worse for generic manufacturers, they could not
begin testing or seek regulatory approval for their generic drugs until the
patents of the brand name manufacturers expired, causing a several-year
time lag before marketing could begin. In Roche Products,Inc. v. Bolar
PharmaceuticalCo., the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that even
submitting an NDA during the patent period is an act of patent
infringement. 6 The Roche court said that the statutory language was not
ambiguous, and that Congress should determine the political question of
whether the effect of the statute was prudent. Accordingly, the court stated
that "it is not our job to apply laws that have not yet been written." 7 This
interpretation of the statute stymied generic manufacturers' efforts to
compete with their brand name rivals.
The patent system also inspired defensive measures by brand name
manufacturers, who feared entering the lengthy clinical trial process
14. Federal, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. 87-781, 76 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2003)).
15. Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Priorto Patent Expiration:An FTC
Study, at 4 (July 2002) [hereinafter FTC Study], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002
/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2006); H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. I, at 16 (1984),
reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2649.
16. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharms. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (superseded by
statute); see infra text accompanying note 20.
17. Roche, 733 F.2d at 865 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104
S. Ct. 774, 796 (1984)).
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without a patent. What if a competitor or generic company were to patent
a nearly identical drug while it was awaiting approval? To prevent this turn
of events, brand name manufacturers secured patents before entering the
clinical trial testing, which reduced the length of their exclusivity period
and shortened the time available to recoup their research and development
investments. One judicially recognized study concluded that the average
life of a patent after approval was a mere seven to ten years, not the
intended seventeen years. 18 Recognizing these deficiencies in the current
patent system, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the
FDCA.1 9
Congress had two goals in mind when it passed the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments in 1984: (1) to increase generic entry, which would create
competition with brand name drugs and drive down average prescription
drug prices for consumers; and (2) to lengthen the exclusivity period for
brand name manufacturers to give added incentives for innovation.
First, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments extended the patents for certain
drugs for up to five years to address the problem of the time lag suffered
by brand name manufacturers awaiting FDA approval.2 ° Second, the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments allowed generic manufacturers to prepare
and file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) during the patent
period by relying on the original NDA of the brand name manufacturer. 2'
18. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING,

THE COMPETITIVE

STATUS OF THE U.S.

PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 79-80 (1983) (citing Statement of William M. Wardell to the
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives, Feb. 14, 1982, at 14).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2003).
20. Id. § 355(c)(3)(D)(ii). This section governs the five year extension and reads in pertinent
part,
If an application.., is approved after September 24, 1984, no application which
refers to the drug... relied upon by the applicant for approval of the application
were not conducted by or for the applicant and for which the applicant has not
obtained a right of reference or use from the person by or for whom the
investigations were conducted may be submitted under subsection (b) of this
section before the expiration of five years from the date of the approval of the
application under subsection (b) of this section.
Id.
21. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I), (II), (III), or (IV). Roche v. Bolarwas superseded by the statute
in so far as the "use" of a patented product is not an act of infringement if it is related to preparing
an Abbreviated New Drug Application. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) governs the grant of this "safe
harbor" and reads in relevant part,
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The Hatch-Waxman Act has also succeeded in increasing generic
competition. Nearly all brand name drugs today with expired patents have
generic counterparts." In addition, empirical research suggests that in
1994 alone, consumers saved between $8 million and $10 million
purchasing generic drugs.23 On the other hand, brand name manufacturers
have largely been successful in preventing entry of generic rivals until
after the patent term has expired.24
One federal appellate judge explained that the Amendments "emerged
from Congress' efforts to balance two conflicting policy objectives: to
induce name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments
necessary to research and develop new drug products, while
simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of
those drugs to market."25
Despite the clear legislative intent behind the Act, its actual application
in the marketplace has often been to stifle generic entry.26 At least one
court has recognized that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments are "complex,
and even cumbersome.., far from a model of legislative draftsmanship."27
The drafters themselves have admitted, "The [Hatch-Waxman Act] has
been turned on its head. We were trying to encourage more generics and
'
through different business arrangements, the reverse has happened."28

(1) It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within
the United States or import into the United States a patented invention... solely
for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003).
22. For 21 brand name pharmaceutical drugs where generics entered between 1991 and 1993,
the CBO study found that in the first full calendar year after entry, generic competitors achieved
a market share of 44%. CBO Study, supranote 4, ch. III, at 28.
23. Id. at 1, 20; see also David Balto, PharmaceuticalPatent Settlements: The Antitrust
Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 325 (2000) (discussing evidence of the success of HatchWaxman).
24. See infra note 39.
25. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting on
other grounds) (citations omitted).
26. See infra text accompanying note 39.
27. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
28. Sheryl Stolberg & Jeff Gerth, Keeping Down the Competition: How Companies Stall
Generics andKeep Themselves Healthy,N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, at Al (quoting Representative
Henry Waxman).
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B. The Statutory Framework
1. The Hatch-Waxman Amendments
In 1984, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to establish a
streamlined approval process for the FDA to use in approving generic
versions of approved branded drugs.29 Brand name manufacturers invest
significant resources in research and development to meet rigorous safety
and effectiveness standards. Under Hatch-Waxman, generic manufacturers
can piggyback off that research and bring knock-off drugs to market more
cheaply.3

First, a generic manufacturer consults the Approved Drug Products
with TherapeuticEquivalenceDeterminations,or "Orange Book," where
all patents are listed, and finds the patent for a brand name drug.3' Second,
the generic manufacturer develops a drug that is "bioequivalent" to the
listed drug.32 Last, the generic manufacturer files an ANDA. 3 The generic
manufacturer must choose which of four types of ANDA certifications to

29. See supra note 10; see also Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (stating that Hatch-Waxman created an expedited approval process for generics). A
generic drug contains the same active ingredient as a brand name drug. Therefore, it will have
nearly the same effect on humans if taken in the same way, ostensibly dispensing with the rationale
for human clinical trials. Generic drugs differ from their brand name counterparts, validating the
claim that they do not infringe the original, because they have different inactive ingredients, and
present some innovation over the original, for instance, in terms of human intake. For example,
assume a patented drug Ache-Be-Gone utilizes the active ingredient unacheathol. This drug is taken
in a small sugar encapsulated tablet and is digested over a period of 1 hour, its effects beginning
after 30 minutes. Assume a generic manufacturer created Ache-No-More, also utilizing
unacheathol, but as an oral spray form. It could be sprayed under the tongue, having the same
effect, with an absorption rate into the body of only 10 minutes, beginning to take effect in 5
minutes. This generic equivalent would, perhaps, not infringe the original because it would
represent an innovation, and yet would have the same effect on humans on the basis of dosage.
30. See FTC Study, supra note 15, at 4. "[G]eneric applicants were permitted to rely on the
brand name company's trade secret data demonstrating the safety and efficacy of the brand name
drug product." Id.
31. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A)(I) (2003).
32. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A). The generic manufacturer must submit enough information to show
that its product has the same active ingredient, including indications for use, dosage form, route of
administration, and other essentials as a drug that has already been approved. Evidence of
"bioequivalence" must be submitted as well as a listing of the generic drug's composition and its
manufacturing procedure. "Bioequivalence" means that the active ingredient is absorbed at the
same rate and to the same extent for the generic drug as for the innovator drug. Samples of the
generic drug must also be provided to the FDA.
33. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I), (II), (III), or (IV).
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pursue, known as Paragraph I, II, I, or V filings, respectively.34 Of these
certifications, the most coveted is the Paragraph IV certification because
it comes with the prize of a 180-day exclusivity period for the first generic
manufacturer to receive certification.35
Paragraph V filings with the FDA state that there is a patent listed in
the Orange Book for the drug that the generic manufacturer seeks to
market. Paragraph IV also states that either: (1) the patent is invalid; or (2)
the generic manufacturer's product does not infringe the existing patent.36
When a generic manufacturer seeks Paragraph IV approval from the FDA
to begin selling a generic drug before the expiration of the brand name
manufacturer's patent, he commits an act of patent infringement.37 Thus,
the pioneer patent owner has the right to sue in United States Federal
District Court within forty-five days of the ANDA filing if the owner
disagrees with3 8the generic manufacturer's contentions of invalidity or noninfringement.
The filing of a patent infringement action by the brand name
manufacturer is virtually guaranteed.39 The statute provides for an
automatic thirty-month stay of FDA approval on the ANDA based on the
mere filing of a patent infringement action.4" Although the brand name
manufacturer files suit within a forty-five-day period, the FDA's
evaluation of the ANDA will continue to go forward in its normal fashion.
However, final approval to market the generic brand does not become
effective until the earliest of: (1) the patent expiration and subsequently

34. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 5.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 3556)(5)(B)(iv).
36. Id. § 355j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2003).
38. 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(B)(iii).
39. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 14-21. The study includes a discussion of the effect of
different certifications and an excellent visual representation. Id. at 15. The study determined that
brand name companies sued Paragraph IV filers within 45 days 72% of the time. Id. at 14. The
study also determined that the brand name manufacturer only'prevailed in 27% of the lawsuits
which reached a verdict. Id. at 16. In contrast, generic manufacturers won much more frequently,
prevailing in 73% of the lawsuits reaching a verdict. Id. Apparently, in recognition of these odds,
the remaining 38% of the lawsuits were settled out of court. See FTC Study, supranote 15, at 16.
Of the 20 settlements studied, 9 were structured as "brand payments" to the generic applicant, and
7 were structured as licenses for the generic applicant to use the brand name patent prior to
expiration. Id. at 17. Demonstrating just how great the stakes are for brand name manufacturers to
preserve their exclusivity period, in 85% of the cases, the brand name manufacturer also sued the
second generic applicant. Id. at 18.
40. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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bringing the generic to market; or (2) a final judicial determination
favorable to the ANDA applicant.4
What is of critical strategic importance to the brand name manufacturer
is that the 180-day market exclusivity period belongs only to the first
generic manufacturer to obtain a Paragraph IV certification. The court in
Mova PharmaceuticalCorp. v. Shalala interpreted 21 C.F.R. § 314.10742
as entitling the first ANDA filer to the 180-day exclusivity period
regardless ofthe outcome of the patent infringement suit. 43 This means that

a generic manufacturer is entitled to the market exclusivity period even if
he cannot successfully defend himself against the patent infringement
claim.
Since the generic manufacturer can make a windfall of billions of
dollars by being the first to compete with the brand name manufacturer,
succeeding in the patent infringement lawsuit and beginning its marketing
efforts as early as possible is a major boon." On the other hand, the brand
name manufacturer would prefer that the generic manufacturer fail to enter

41. Id.
42. 21 C.F.R. § 314.107 governs the award of 180-day market exclusivity and reads in
relevant part,
(c) Subsequent abbreviated new drug application submission. (1) If an abbreviated
new drug application contains a certification that a relevant patent is invalid,
unenforceable, or will not be infringed and the application is for a generic copy
of the same listed drug for which one or more substantially complete abbreviated
new drug applications were previously submitted containing a certification that the
same patent was invalid, unenforceable, or would not be infringed, approval of the
subsequent abbreviated new drug application will be made effective no sooner
than 180 days from whichever of the following dates is earlier:
1.
The date the applicant submitting the first application first commences
commercial marketing of its drug product; or
2.
The date of a decision of a court holding the relevant patent invalid,
unenforceable, or not infringed.
21 C.F.R. § 314.107 (2000).
43. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1066-74 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The
outcome in Mova signaled a judicial retreat from the original FDA interpretation of 21 C.F.R. §
314.107 requiring that the generic manufacturer be the first to file and also successfully defend
itself in a patent infringement suit brought against it by the patent holder to obtain a grant of
exclusivity. Id. at 1069. On the other hand, the FTC views the Mova formulation as creating a
"bottleneck" which effectively forestalls entry until 180 days after the expiration of the brand name
manufacturer's patent. Sheppard Mullin, 180 Days of Exclusive Marketing: A Right, An Incentive,
or a Property Interest?, available at http://www.antitrustlawblog.com/article-180-days-ofexclusive-marketing-a-right-an-incentive-or-a-property-interest.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2006).
44. See Mova Pharm. Corp., 140 F.3d at 1064.
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the market. Under Mova Pharmaceuticals,a failure by the first ANDA
filer to trigger the exclusivity period through market entry will preclude all
other generic manufacturers from entering the market.45 If the brand name
manufacturer can reach a settlement agreement, convincing the first
ANDA filer not to enter the market, he prevents all generic entry.46 The
FTC and other commentators believe this result has the opposite effect of
that intended by the Hatch-Waxman Act.47
The only way for a second ANDA filer to gain entry once this
bottleneck is put into place is to succeed in winning its own patent
infringement suit with the brand name manufacturer before the first
ANDA filer, triggering the exclusivity period.48 While the second ANDA
filer would still be unable to enter the market for 180 days, this approach
is favorable for two strategic reasons: (1) to prevent the initial ANDA filer
from cornering the generic market for that prescription drug; and (2) to
prevent a bottleneck and create an incentive for the initial ANDA filer to
sell its position to him.49
This dilemma, resulting from the decision in Granutec,Inc. v. Shalala,
created a virtual race among subsequent generic filers to secure a final
judgment because subsequent ANDA filers could now trigger the
exclusivity period at a point before the first filer could resolve the patent
infringement suit that prevented it from marketing its generic drug.5° A
45. See id. at 1067.
46. This is the case because the 180-day exclusivity period does not begin until the first
generic applicant's commencement of marketing the generic product or a final judicial
determination favorable to the ANDA applicant. If there is a settlement, no final judicial
determination has taken place. Moreover, where the settlement is structured as "brand payments"
by the brand name manufacturer in return for an agreement not to commence marketing, the 180day exclusivity period is "parked" or stalled from ever beginning to run. This result is also referred
to as a "bottleneck," because it hinders the progress of generic entry past the neck of the bottle (the
point of the first generic applicant receiving Paragraph IV certification).
47. See generally FTC Study, supranote 15.
48. See Granutec, Inc. v. Shalala, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1398, 1404-06 (4th Cir. 1998); Teva
Pharms., USA, Inc. v. FDA, 182 F.3d 1003, 1005 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (requiring the FDA to
recognize the dismissal with prejudice of an infringement suit against a subsequent filer as
triggering the first filer's 180-day exclusivity period). For a full discussion of Granutec and timing
issues see Colman B. Ragan, Saving the Lives of Drugs: Why Amendment of Hatch-Waxman and
CertificationofMarkman HearingsforInterlocutoryAppeal Will Help LowerDrugPrices, 13 FED.
CIR. BAR J. 411, 419-22 (2003).
49. Most settlement agreements account for this contingency by disallowing the generic
applicant to sell its position to another competitor.
50. See FTC Study, supra note 15, at 35-39. One study by the FTC concluded that in 6 out
of 7 cases where a brand name manufacturer entered into a settlement agreement with the second
generic applicant, the brand name manufacturer had already entered into a settlement agreement
with the first generic applicant. Id. at 35. Ostensibly, this posturing of brand name manufacturers
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successful patent infringement defense by any subsequent ANDA filer
means that if the first ANDA filer is still tied up in court when the
exclusivity period begins, the exclusivity period becomes useless to him.
Thus, this in-fighting among generic rivals creates an incentive for the
original generic manufacturer to sell its position with regard to
infringement challenge.
The scenario of in-fighting among generic rivals to secure market
position is admittedly complex, but what is much simpler is the ability of
the brand name manufacturer to stifle its generic competitors by entering
into a settlement agreement with the first ANDA filer. There are several
types of settlement agreements."
2. Forms of Settlement Agreements
a. Supply Agreements
One form of settlement agreement between brand name manufacturers
and their generic rivals allows the generic manufacturer to market the
brand name product under the brand name manufacturer's own generic
name.52 These agreements are referred to as "supply agreements," because
the generic manufacturer becomes a distributor of the brand name
product.53 If the generic manufacturer is the first to file an ANDA, it is
entitled to the 180-day exclusivity period. 4 Before the Medicare Act, this
type of agreement would prevent the 180-day exclusivity period from
beginning to run indefinitely, creating a bottleneck.55
b. License Agreements
Another form of settlement agreement is a "license agreement," where
the generic applicant obtains a non-exclusive, royalty-bearing license to
use the brand name company's patent prior to expiration.56 In half of the
agreements studied by the FTC, the generic competitor could begin selling

was meant to prevent the second generic applicant from "triggering" the 180-day exclusivity period
which was "parked," or prevented from running, by the settlement agreement between the brand
name manufacturer and the first generic applicant.
51. Id. at 28.
52. Id. at 30.
53. Id. Two of the 20 agreements analyzed in the FTC Study took this form. Id.
54. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2003).
55. See id.
56. FTC Study, supra note 15, at 28.
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the generic product immediately after a settlement was reached, and in the
other half of the agreements, a waiting period proceeded entry.57
c. Agreements with Brand Payments
The type of agreement that has received the most FTC and judicial
scrutiny is the "brand payment agreement," in which the generic applicant
is prohibited from purchasing, manufacturing, using, selling, distributing,
or shipping to third parties any form of the generic drug prior to the
expiration of the brand name manufacturer's patent.5 8 This form of
agreement constituted roughly half of those studied by the FTC. 59 The
range of brand payments was between $1.75 million and $132.5 million,
for a time period ranging between 4 months and 10 years.60 In each of
these cases, the failure of the first generic applicant to market its generic
product created a bottleneck, forestalling all generic entry.
C. CongressionalResponse: The MedicareAct
On December 8, 2003, President Bush signed the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003
(Medicare Act).6 Title XI of the Act, "Access to Affordable
Pharmaceuticals," modifies certain provisions covering generic drugs set
forth in the Hatch-Waxman Act.6 2 The Medicare Act modifies the HatchWaxman Amendments in a number of significant ways: (1) only one 30month stay is allowed; 63 (2) the 180-day exclusivity period may be shared
by generics filing on the same day;' (3) an ANDA applicant may file a
declaratory judgment action against the patent holder; 65 (4) an ANDA
applicant may file a counterclaim to de-list the brand name manufacturers

57. Id.
58. Id. at 31.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub L. No.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
62. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, at Title XI,
entitled "Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals," Pub. L. No. 108-173 (2003) (modifying § 5050)
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2004))).
63. See infra text accompanying note 77.
64. See infra text accompanying note 80.
65. See infra text accompanying note 81.
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patent;66 and (5) certain conditions may result in a forfeiture of the 180-day
exclusivity period.67
The most important modifications of the existing law are the limit of
a single 30-month stay and the requirement that a generic manufacturer
market the drug in a timely manner or lose its 180-day exclusivity period.6"
On June 19, 2003, the Senate approved a generic drug proposal including
the single 30-month stay and 180-day forfeiture provisions by an
overwhelming 94-to-I vote, making those provisions part of the Act.69
Remarking on the reason for the proposal, Senator Charles E. Schumer,
Democrat of New York, said that in recent years, brand name companies
have used "frivolous patents, lawsuits and legal mumbo-jumbo" to delay
generic drug entry.7" Schumer said that the proposal could save consumers
$60 billion to $70 billion in the next decade. 7'
1. Only One 30-Month Stay Allowed
The Hatch-Waxman Amendments required approval of an ANDA to
be stayed until the earlier of 30 months or the favorable outcome of a
patent infringement suit by the ANDA filer.72 Prior to passage of the
Medicare Act, brand name manufacturers litigating claims of patent
infringement could list newer patents related to the challenged patent,
generating successive 30-month stays on approval. The brand name
manufacturer would often successfully argue that approval could not take
place until the final 30-month stay had run, taking advantage of ambiguity
in the statutory language. The Medicare Act resolves this ambiguity by
clarifying that the 30-month stay is available only for patents listed before
the ANDA application submission that gave rise to the patent infringement
suit. 73 Effectively, this modification limits the patent holder to only one

66. See infra text accompanying note 87.
67. See infra text accompanying note 88.
68. See supranote 46; this is the congressional response to the "bottleneck" problem, which
results when the 180-day exclusivity period is "parked" and stalled from beginning to run.
69. Robert Pear & Robin Toner, Senate Votes to Give Consumers FasterAccess to Generic
Drugs,Amending Medicare Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2003, at A18.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2003).
73. Section 1l01(a)(1)(D)(i) governs this exclusion of subsequent filings and reads in
relevant part: "An applicant may not amend or supplement an application to seek approval of a drug
referring to a different listed drug from the listed drug identified in the [ANDA] application as
submitted to the Secretary." Section 1101(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) further clarifies that the 45-day window
for triggering the 30-month stay through the filing of a patent infringement lawsuit applies to
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30-month stay for each ANDA application it challenges through a patent
infringement suit.74
Under the Medicare Act, FDA approval of a Paragraph IV ANDA will
be effective within 30 months, whether or not the innovator late-lists any
newer patents during the pending lawsuit.75 The Medicare Act further
clarifies that the district court decision favorable to the ANDA applicant
triggers approval. The 30-month stay will terminate prior to the expiration
of 30 months on the date the district court enters ajudgment that the patent
is invalid or not infringed, or that there is no cause of action on which
relief can be granted.76 However, if the district court holds in favor of the
patent holder and the decision is appealed successfully, the 30-month stay
will terminate prior to the expiration of 30 months on the date of the court
of appeals decision that the patent is invalid or not infringed, or rules that
there is no cause of action on which relief can be granted.77

the patent that is the subject of the certification and for which the information was
submitted to the Secretary under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(2) before the date on
which the application(excludingan amendmentor supplement to the application),
which the Secretary later determines to be substantially complete, was submitted.
§ 1 101(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), as amended by Pub. L. No. 108-173 reads in relevant part:
"If such an action is brought before the expiration of such days, the approval shall be made
effective upon the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the date of the receipt of the
notice provided under paragraph (2)(B)(i) .... Paragraph (2)(B)(i) contains the requirement for
the generic manufacturer to notify the patent holder of its Paragraph IV ANDA, triggering the 45day window where a patent infringement suit can be brought by the patent holder.
76. § 11 01(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)); § 1101(b)(2)(B)(i)
(amending 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C)). Section 1 101(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) of the Medicare Act, Title XI,
reads in relevant part,
(1) if before the expiration of such period the district court decides that the patent
is invalid or not infringed (including any substantive determination that there is
no cause of action for patent infringement or invalidity), the approval shall be
made effective on (aa) the date on which the court enters judgment reflecting the decision; or
(bb) the date of a settlement order or consent decree signed and entered by the
court stating that the patent that is the subject of the certification is invalid or not
infringed.
§ I 10
01 (a)(2)(A)(ii)(I).

77. § 1101 (a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (amending21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)); § 1101 (b)(2)(B)(ii)(lI)
(amending 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C)(i)(II)). Section 1101 (a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Medicare Act, Title
XI, reads in relevant part,

PHARMACEUTICAL PA TENT SETTLEMENTS: FAULT LINES

Significantly, the Medicare Act specifies that when the ANDA filer
prevails in the patent infringement suit (which empirical research shows
will occur about three-fourths of the time),78 approval takes place on the
date of the district court's decision, rather than on the date of the appeals
court's decision, expediting the entry of the generic drug into the market.79
2. The 180-Day Exclusivity Period May be Shared
As generic applicants race to secure first-filer status for their generic
drugs, disagreements could ensue as to who actually submitted their
application first. The 180-day exclusivity of each generic applicant would
be blocked until the issue was resolved. Under the Medicare Act, "first
applicants" are defined as including all applicants who submit
substantially complete ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications on the
same day. 80 Therefore, if two generic applicants file on the same day, they
are both entitled to a shared 180-day exclusivity period.
3. ANDA Applicants Can File for Declaratory Judgment
While declaratory judgment actions could be filed by generic
applicants submitting Paragraph IV certifications, the Medicare Act
attempts to provide a jurisdictional hook, stating that "the courts of the
United States shall, to the extent consistent with the Constitution, have
subject matter jurisdiction" in a suit for declaratory judgment that a patent

(II) if before the expiration of such period the district court decides that the patent
has been infringed (aa) if the judgment of the district court is appealed, the approval shall be made
effective on (AA) the date on which the court of appeals decides that the patent is invalid or
not infringed (including any substantive determination that there is no cause of
action for patent infringement or invalidity); or
(BB) the date of a settlement order or consent decree signed and entered by the
court of appeals stating that the patent that is the subject of the certification is
invalid or not infringed; or
(bb) if the judgment of the district court is not appealed or is affirmed, the
approval shall be made effective on the date specified by the district court in a
court order under section 271 (e)(4)(A) of title 35, United States Code.
§ 1101(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
78. See supra text accompanying note 39.
79. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(II), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-173, reads in relevant part:
"Any action brought under section 2201 shall be brought in the judicial district where the defendant
has its principal place of business or a regular and established place of business."
80. § 1102(a)(1) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb)).
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is invalid or not infringed."' Courts have discretion over whether to hear
declaratory judgment actions, based on whether immediate harm to the
plaintiff is likely to result.8 2 The declaratory judgment action can be
brought upon: (1) the expiration of the forty-five-day notice period for
filing an infringement suit; and (2) the Paragraph IV certification asserting
non-infringement. 3 The rationale is that a generic manufacturer could still
be subject to a patent infringement suit, or could have its patent challenged
even after it has received FDA approval. This provision is designed to
prevent apprehension in generic manufacturers preparing to market their
generic drug.
The Conference Report on this provision urged courts to apply the
"reasonable apprehension" test for declaratory judgment suits "in a manner
that provides generic drug manufacturers appropriate access to declaratory
judgment relief to the extent required by Article HI of the Constitution." 4
It remains to be seen how the courts will interpret this provision, and
whether they will give it any teeth.
In Teva PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., the district court
held that listing a patent in the Orange Book, without more, is not a
sufficient threat of a lawsuit.8 The district court's ruling suggests that
courts may be unwilling to grant declaratory judgment when a lawsuit is
not imminent,
despite the high probability that a patent holder will file
6
8

suit.

4. ANDA Applicants May File a Counterclaim to De-List
A generic applicant may assert a counterclaim seeking an order
requiring the patent holder to correct or delete patent information on the
grounds that the patent does not claim the drug for which it was approved,

81. § 1101(d) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5) (2003)).
82. See, e.g., State Auto Ins. Cos. v. Summy, 234 F.3d 131, 133 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that
a grant ofjurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, is discretionary and
courts are under "no compulsion to exercise it").
83. Supra text accompanying note 73.
84. § 1101(d) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(5) (2003)). The new statute allowed for generic
drug makers to seek a judicial determination as to the respective rights of the parties, authorizing
courts to apply the "reasonable apprehension" test for declaratory judgment suits "in a manner that
provides generic drug manufacturers appropriate access to declaratoryjudgment relief to the extent
required by Article III of the Constitution." Id.
85. 2003 WL 22888848 *4 (D. Mass. 2003).
86. Supra text accompanying note 39. Patent holders file suit against Paragraph IV filers 72%
of the time. Id.
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or does not claim a valid method of use.87 This "wrongful listing"
provision of the Medicare Act clarifies that the method of use assigned to
the patent, which is held by the patent holder, should be scrutinized to
ensure its validity by allowing the generic manufacturer to bring a
counterclaim specifically as to the method of use.
5. The 180-Day Exclusivity Period May be Forfeited
The bottleneck created by settlement agreements is subject to the
greatest attack by consumer advocates because it artificially increases the
patent holder's term, and allows it to circumvent the courts. In response to
these concerns, the Medicare Act modifies the 180-day exclusivity period,
creating a use-it-or-lose-it rule. The Medicare Act provides that the 180day exclusivity period will be forfeited by any number of forfeiture events,
causing approval of subsequent ANDAs to take place immediately.8" The
first applicant forfeits its exclusivity period if the first applicant fails to
market its drug by the later of: (1) 75 days after the first applicant's
approval is made, or 30 months after the date of submission of the
application, whichever is earlier; or (2) 75 days after a final decision that
the patent is invalid by a court from which no appeal has been taken, an
infringement or declaratory judgment action is settled and the court signs
the consent, or the patent holder withdraws the patent information.89 This
provision reduces the incentive for brand name manufacturers to enter into
patent settlements with provisions that require the generic manufacturer
not to market its product for the entire 180-day exclusivity period, creating
a bottleneck.

87. Section 1 101(a)(2)(C), amending 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii), which reads in relevant
part,
IN GENERAL. -If

an owner of the patent or the holder of the approved application
under subsection (b) for the drug that is claimed by the patent brings a patent
infringement action against the applicant, the applicant may assert a counterclaim
seeking an order requiring the holder to correct or delete the patent information
submitted by the holder under subsection (b) or (c) on the ground that the patent
does not claim either (aa) the drug for which the application was approved; or
(bb) an approved method of using the drug.
§ 1101(a)(2)(c).
88. § 1 102(a)(2) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(ii)); § 1001 (a)(2) (amending 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(iii)).
89. § 1102(a)(2) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)).
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D. FTC Enforcement Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) views patent settlements as anticompetitive, and has challenged a number of settlements. 90 The FTC's
enforcement actions with regard to settlement agreements and the process
of FTC enforcement is best illustrated by analyzing the FTC's response to
the Schering-Plough case. This illustration will also provide a framework
for understanding the antitrust rules explained later in the context of patent
infringement litigation.
1. Administrative Judge Rejects Commission's View of
Patent Settlements
In August 1995, Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. (Upsher-Smith)
became the first generic manufacturer to file an ANDA relying on
Schering-Plough Corp.'s (Schering) patent on a potassium chloride
supplement, K-Dur 20. 9' On December 15, 1995, Schering sued UpsherSmith for patent infringement. 92 Also in December 1995, ESI Lederle, Inc.
(ESI), a division of American Home Products, filed its own ANDA for a
second generic version of Schering's drug. 93 Schering later initiated a
patent infringement suit against ESI in February 1996. 9'
Two years after initiation of the original patent infringement lawsuit,
on the eve of trial, June 17, 1997, Schering and Upsher-Smith entered into
a settlement agreement. 95 Under the agreement, Schering gave UpsherSmith a payment of $60 million and 5 licenses to market Schering
products. In return, Upsher-Smith agreed not to market its generic version
of the K-Dur 20 drug prior to September 2001 (five years before

90. In the Matter of Abbott Labs., Dkt. No. C-3945 (May 22, 2000) (consent order),
complaint available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/ c3945complaint.htm; In the Matter of
Geneva Pharm., Inc., Dkt. No. C-3946 (May 22, 2000) (consent order), complaint available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/200O/05/c3946complaint.htm; Hoechs Marion Roussel, Inc., Dkt. No. 9293
(May 8, 2001) (consent order), complaint available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/
hoechstandrxcomplaint.htm; see Thomas B. Leary, Opinion of the Commission In the Matter of
Schering-Plough Corp., at 2 n.3 [hereinafter Opinion of the Commission], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/031218commissionopinon.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2006).
91. Opinion of the Commission, supranote 90, at 3.
92. Id. at 4.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 4.
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Schering's patent would expire).9 6 The patent infringement claims were
disposed of under the agreements.97
On March 30, 2001, the FTC issued a complaint alleging that the
agreements between Schering and Upsher-Smith and between Schering
and ESI violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45, because the agreements delayed the entry of low-cost generic
competition to Schering's K-Dur 20 drug. 98 The FTC alleged that these
agreements
cost consumers $100 million, due to the delayed generic
99
entry.

On June 27, 2002, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)rejected the
FTC's view that the patent infringement settlement agreements violated
antitrust rules, and dismissed the allegations. 00 The court noted that in the
past, the FTC had invalidated agreements that delayed entry of a generic
entrant until the lawsuit was resolved.' 0 ' Distinguishing the present
situation, the court took judicial notice of the fact that the agreements in
this case actually disposed of the patent infringement claims. 0 2 The FTC
judge refused to hold that the alleged "market allocation" by ScheringPlough was illegal per se, because FTC theories assumed that Schering's
patent was invalid, an assumption not supported by the facts.0 3
2. The FTC Appeals the Initial Decision and the Commission Reverses
The FTC appealed the ALJ's initial decision." ° One commentator
noted, "The Commissioner's appeals process is an unusual (and perhaps)
unique procedure in the federal government whereby the FTC is permitted
to act as judge, jury, and prosecutor in the same case."'0 5 The process is
unusual because the appeal of the initial order is heard by the full
Commission, the body who originally issued the complaint against

96. Opinion of the Commission, supra note 90, at 4.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Administrative Law Judge Dismisses FTC
Allegations of Anticompetitive Conduct by Schering-Plough and Upsher Smith (July 2, 2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/07/schering.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
100. In the Matter of Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2002 WL 1488085 (FTC); see also
Geraldine M. Alexis & Zorah Braithwaite, FTCAdministrative Judge Rejects Commission's View
of DrugPatent Settlements, 18 ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP. 23 (2003).
101. Alexis & Braithwaite, supranote 100, at 23.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 23, 24.
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Schering-Plough. 10 6 In an even more unusual procedural twist, the
Commission is not required to give any deference to the ALJ's findings
and may review the record de novo. °7 Until recently, the justification
behind this procedure was that the individual commissioners issuing the
complaint would have been replaced before the appeal went through, since
cases before the Commission were resolved slowly. 08
' Now, after adopting
a fast-track procedure in 1996, the Commission moves cases along so
quickly that the same commissioners will likely try the appeal that issued
the original complaint, leaving very little due process protection.' °9 One
commentator notes that this unusual procedure
leaves the Commission in an awkward position. Either it will affirm
the ALJ's decision, thereby indicating that it was wrong in issuing
the Complaint, or it will override the ALJ's decision, and find an
antitrust violation in the face of some very clear evidence of
legitimate business activity, pro-competitive benefits, and public
policy considerations."
The Commission's authority to review de novo both the factual findings
and the legal conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge are derived
from 16 C.F.R. § 3.54(a)."'
On December 8, 2003, the Commissioner entered a final order and
opinion holding that Schering-Plough violated section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.112 In determining the applicable
standard of review, the Commission cited the Sixth Circuit decision in
Cardizem CD AntitrustLitigationfor the proposition that it is per se illegal
for a pioneer drug company to pay money to a generic manufacturer in
return for a commitment to delay entry. 113 However, the Commission
acknowledged the current trend away from the per se rule of illegality."14

106. Alexis & Braithwaite, supranote 100, at 23, 24.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Opinion of the Commission, supra note 90, at 8.
112. See id. at 1.
113. Id. at 12; 5 Trade Reg. Rep. at 22459, slip op. at 30-32 (6th Cir. 2003).
114. Opinion of the Commission, supra note 90, at 12-13. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva
Pharms. Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1313 (11 th Cir. 2003) (reversing the district court's per se holding);
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
(declining to apply the per se rule); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 262 F. Supp. 2d 17,
24 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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The Commission went on to conclude that in the patent context, bright-line
distinctions are not particularly helpful." 5 The Commission then adopted
of the market
a rule of reason standard of review, and analyzed the nature
l6
and the market effects of the agreements in question.'
1I.

RELEVANT ANTITRUST LAWS

A. Horizontaland Vertical Restraints
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (Sherman Act) prohibits
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
'
The ban on "contracts in restraint of trade"
with foreign nations."117
applies only to unreasonable restraints and those that impair
competition."' The "rule of reason" is the prevailing standard of analysis
for these antitrust claims." 9 Under this rule, the fact-finder weighs all the
circumstances of a case, including all the circumstances surrounding the
making of the agreement in question and the agreement's aggregate effect
on the market. 20

115. See supra text accompanying note 113.
116. See supra text accompanying note 113.
117. Sherman Act § 1, amendedby 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
118. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918).
119. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,50 (1977).
120. Chi. Bd.of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238. Justice Brandeis set out the most frequently cited
statement of the rule of reason:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention
will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
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A much more abbreviated analysis is applicable to certain types of
agreements that judicial experience has determined will almost certainly
violate the Sherman Act. As the Court explained in Northern Pacific
RailroadCo. v. United States, a court may analyze restraints on trade as
unreasonable per se if the type of conduct involved has a "pernicious effect
on competition [and] lack[s] .. .any redeeming virtue."'' A court may
only conclude that a restraint is manifestly anti-competitive once it has
sufficient experience with the restraint in question. 22 As Justice Harlan
stated in his Albrecht dissent, the per se rule does not ask if a type of
agreement is ever illegal, but whether it is always illegal.'23
Agreements that have been judicially recognized as illegal per se fall
into two categories, horizontal and vertical, depending primarily on
whether they effect interbrand or intrabrand competition. The primary
24
purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect interbrand competition.
Interbrand competition takes place when manufacturers of the same
125
product compete for the business of consumers, creating lower prices.
The extreme example of a lack of interbrand competition is a monopoly,
manufacturer of a product who has complete
where there is only one
26
control over its price.
Restraints on interbrand competition are broadly labeled horizontal
restraints because they are made between competitors at the same level of
the market supply chain. A simple example is if all of the major airlines
agreed to set one price for round trip tickets to Brazil, preventing any price
competition between brands. Supply and demand concerns aside, in this
horizontal agreement, the airlines act as if they were a monopolist, and

121. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
122. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1,9 (1979). The rationale for
the use of the per se rule in these cases is a matter of judicial efficiency; the Court should not be
required to undergo a lengthy in-depth analysis of an agreement when it can "predict with
confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it." Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
123. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). "Per se rules
thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social utility of particular
commercial practices." Cont'l T V.,433 U.S. at 50 n.16.
124. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) (stating that "there is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason
standard [because] interbrand competition is the primary concern of the antitrust laws" and the
court should avoid "formalistic distinctions").
125. Restraints on interbrand competition are labeled horizontal restraints because they occur
between competitors in the marketplace, reduce output, and increase price. These agreements
reduce supply, raise revenues for the manufacturer, and cause consumers to pay a higher price than
efficient supply and demand principles would dictate.
126. Cont'l TV., 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
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charge consumers a higher price than consumer demand dictates. The
Sherman Act condemns most horizontal agreements among competitors
because they are naked restrictions on competition that rarely have any
redeeming pro-competitive justification.'27 Examples of horizontal
agreements include price fixing, 2 output restraints,129 market division, °
boycotts,' 3 ' and minimum resale price maintenance
certain group
32
agreements.
By contrast, a court is more reluctant to invalidate agreements
restraining intrabrand competition because these agreements are more
likely to have pro-competitive side effects.' 33 "Intrabrand competition is
the competition between the distributors wholesale or retail of the product
of a particular manufacturer.' ' 34 Intrabrand competition takes place, for
example, if two privately owned Getty brand gas stations located one mile
apart compete for sales by lowering their prices on Getty brand gasoline,
or if two local convenience stores selling Snickers candy bars compete for
sales through rival promotions. Examples of restraints on intrabrand
136
competition include location restrictions,

35

exclusive territories,

minimum resale price maintenance,' and retail customer restrictions.'38
These restraints on intrabrand competition are broadly labeled vertical
restraints because they are imposed by suppliers on their distributors down
the market supply chain.
7

127. An example of a pro-competitive justification is a counterbalancing increase in the
competitiveness of a firm producing a consumer good, or in the competition between firms in the
marketplace. Horizontal agreements generally lack any pro-competitive justification.
128. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,212-13 (1940); FTC v. Sup. Ct.
Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 434 (1990). In White Motor Co., Justice Brennan, in his
concurring opinion, distinguished nonprice restrictions from price fixing schemes, noting that
"[r]esale price maintenance is not only designed to, but almost invariably does in fact, reduce price
competition not only among sellers of the affected product, but quite as much between that product
and competing brands." White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 268 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
129. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984).
130. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
131. Nw. Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985).
132. See Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, Issued by the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 3.4 (Apr. 6, 1995), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm#t34.
133. For a discussion of the different forms of vertical restraints, see generally Cont'l T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 (1977).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 52-53.
137. Id. at 52.
138. Cont'l TV., 433 U.S. at48 n.14.
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Vertical restrictions can take the form of price restrictions imposed by
a manufacturer on down-market distributors, or those that divide markets
and regulate downstream competition, imposing limitations on how
retailers and distributors can sell the brand name product. 3 9 In Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., the Supreme Court acknowledged that
"the market impact of vertical restrictions is complex because of their
potential for a simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and
stimulation of interbrand competition."' 4 °
Using the example of the Getty gas stations, assume there are only
these two Getty gas stations in a geographic area, like the Brooklyn
Heights neighborhood in New York. Assume there is also a Texaco station
located in Brooklyn Heights. If the first of the franchise Getty gas stations
was managed better than the second, and the second gas station attempted
to raise prices to compensate for its lower sales, two market effects would
take place: (1) consumers would associate higher Getty gasoline prices
with the Getty gasoline brand and substitute Texaco gasoline; and (2) the
loyal Getty brand customers would shift to the first Getty gas station with
the lower prices. If this situation continued, the owners of the Getty gas
stations might be unable to compete with the Texaco gas station in
Brooklyn Heights and might be forced to sell its franchise stations and
leave the Brooklyn Heights market. The result would be a Texaco gas
monopoly in Brooklyn Heights and higher prices to the Brooklyn Heights
consumers.
To compete with Texaco, Getty gas suppliers might decide to institute
a vertical agreement restricting its retail franchisees by allowing only one
Getty brand distributor to continue to sell in that area. The result would be
a reduction of intrabrand competition among Getty gasoline retailers; in
fact, intrabrand competition would be eliminated in this case. At the same
time, there would be an increase in interbrand competition in the Brooklyn
Heights area, since the better-managed Getty gas station would be able to
compete more effectively with the Texaco gasoline station and retain its
market position. In the end, consumers would pay less for gasoline. This
is one simplified illustration of why a court is more hesitant to apply a per
se illegality standard to a vertical restriction without an in-depth analysis
into the reason for the agreement and the market effect produced by it.
Here, a court might invalidate the agreement, reasoning that the Getty
brand gasoline supplier has both a significant market share and a great deal
of control over its distribution, such that a location restriction completely
eradicating interbrand competition is not necessary for the supplier to
139. Id. at 51.
140. Id.
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compete effectively. A court would be telling the supplier to choose a less
restrictive means for controlling its distribution chain, a means that does
not completely eliminate intrabrand competition.
A court's decision might be different for a new entrant into the gasoline
market, like a start-up gasoline distributor operating only in New York
State that is struggling to capture market share from its larger rivals. As
this illustration shows, each market situation is sui generis, and must be
examined on its own facts.
B. Departurefrom the Per Se and Rule of Reason Dichotomy
The current trend in judicial analysis regarding agreements that give
rise to antitrust scrutiny is away from the categorical analysis of
agreements. Judicial analysis currently places these agreements into one
of the two largely outcome determinative categories. 4 ' As early as 1988,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Business ElectronicsCorp.v. SharpElectronics
Corp. acknowledged that the Court should not make "formalistic
distinctions" in the antitrust area. 142 More recently, in CaliforniaDental
Ass 'n v. FTC, Justice Souter announced that the U.S. Supreme Court was
moving toward an "enquiry meet for the case, looking to the
circumstances, details and logic of a restraint."' 43

141. In fact, courts are increasingly looking at all ofthe surrounding market characteristics and
at the effects a given agreement has on the market to determine if it is anti-competitive. See supra
text accompanying note 114.
142. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988).
143. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999) (stating that "the circumstances
here demonstrate, there is generally no categorical line to be drawn between restraints that give rise
to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those that call for more detailed
treatment"). Justice Souter explained that if in a successive number of similar cases the rule of
reason led to the same conclusion, the Court's experience in dealing with these kind of agreements
would suggest that the set of circumstances called for a less searching analysis. Id. at 781. Justice
Souter further advised that "the truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are
less fixed than terms like 'per se,' 'quick look,' and 'rule of reason' tend to make them appear." Id.
at 779. "There is always something of a sliding scale in appraising reasonableness, but the sliding
scale formula deceptively suggests greater precision than we can hope for .... Nevertheless, the
quality of proof required should vary with the circumstances. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1507,
at 402 (1986), cited in Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 80.
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IV. CIRCUIT COURT'S SPLIT ON STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR
PATENT SETTLEMENTS

A. The CircuitsDisagreeon the StandardofReview

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently disagreed with the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' application of a per se illegality standard
for analyzing patent settlements, admonishing the circuit court for failing
to account for the exclusionary rights of the patent holder.'" In an age of
increasing technological development, businesses enter into complex
agreements to manage risk and protect their investment in research.
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the exclusionary rights
of the patent holder as a defense to an antitrust claim.'45 In his Walker
ProcessEquipment Co. concurrence, Justice Harlan addressed the need for
balancing antitrust liability with the innovation incentives of the patent
regime, with the aim of "achieving a suitable accommodation between the
' As will be seen in the discussion of the two cases to
differing policies."146
follow, settlement agreements entered into against the backdrop of the
complexity of the patent system under the Hatch-Waxman Act and the
uncertainty of patent litigation, have varied effects in each individual
case. 147

144. Gary Young, Antitrust Violation Not Patently Clear,CircuitSplits, 26 NAT'L L.J., Sept.
22,2003, at 15; see also, Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1310-12 (11 th
Cir. 2003).
145. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem Corp., 382 U.S. 172,179
concurring).
(1965) (Harlan, J.,
146. Id., cited in Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1311.
147. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1308 n.20. The circuit court stated:
The cost and complexity of most patent litigation is a familiar problem to the court
system. See, e.g., Blonder Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. ofIll. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
331-32 & 334-38 (1971) (citation omitted); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138
F.3d 1448, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting) (discussing claim
construction); Matter of Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2002 WL 1488085,
*166-67 & *239-40 (F.T.C. June 27,2002) (citation omitted); See also Crane, 54
FLA. L. REV. at 757. The cost savings of settlement, both to the parties and to the
public, are equally widely-recognized. See Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531
F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976) ("Public policy favors settlement of disputes
without litigation. Settlement is of particular value in patent litigation, the nature
of which is often inordinately complex and time consuming.").
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Given these complexities, loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman Act should
be addressed by Congress, as was effectively done in the Medicare Act.
When hearing antitrust claims, courts should analyze each settlement
agreement on its particular facts, taking into account the effect of the
agreement on the relevant market. Hence, the U.S. Supreme Court should
follow the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the current trend in
antitrust law and require an "enquiry meet for the case" in analyzing patent
litigation settlements.'48 Given the uniqueness of each patent settlement,
the Supreme Court should instruct the lower courts to presumptively
default to a rule of reason analysis.
B. The Casefor a Per Se Rule: Cardizem CD
1. Factual Background
Hoescht Marion Roussel, Inc. (HMR) manufactured and patented the
prescription drug marketed as Cardizem CD, with the active ingredient
diltiazem hydrochloride (HC1).149 Diltiazem HC1 is used for the treatment
of hypertension and for the prevention of heart attacks and strokes. 50 On
December 30, 1995, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Andrx) filed a
Paragraph IV ANDA for a generic drug utilizing diltiazem hydrochloride
as its active ingredient stating that the generic product did not infringe the
patents filed with the FDA for diltiazem HCl. 51 In January, 1996, HMR
sued Andrx for patent infringement, claiming that Andrx's generic product
infringed its patent for diltiazem HCl. 52 This lawsuit triggered the 30month stay on FDA approval.153
On September 15, 1997, the FDA approved Adnrx's ANDA, subject to
expiration of the 30-month waiting period or a final judgment that the
Andrx product did not infringe the diltiazem HC1 patent.154 Nine days later,
on September 24, 1997, HMR and Andrx entered into an agreement
(Agreement) under which Andrx dismissed its counterclaims and provided
that it would not market its generic version of diltiazem HC1 until the
earliest of: (1) obtaining a final unappealable judgment of non-

148. See supra text accompanying note 143.
149. Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 332 F.3d 896, 901 (6th
Cir. 2003).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 902.
152. Id.
153. Id.

154. Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 902.
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infringement; (2) HMR and Andrx entering into a license agreement; or
(3) HMR entering into a license agreement with a third party. 55
Significantly, Andrx agreed not to exercise its 180-day exclusivity
period.156 HMR agreed to make quarterly payments of $40 million per
year, beginning on the day Andrx received FDA approval.5 7 The payments
would increase to $100 million per year if one of the following occurred:
the patent was found not infringed, HMR dismissed the infringement suit,
or a final judgment failed to determine the issue of the patent's validity. 58
The plaintiffs were a group of representatives from various states who
were direct purchasers of the HMR drug.159 The plaintiffs alleged that in
the absence of the Agreement and the $40 million per year payments,
Andrx would have brought its generic product to market upon receiving
FDA approval, and consumers would have enjoyed lower prices.16 ° The
district court certified for interlocutory appeal the question of whether the
Agreement was a naked, horizontal restraint of trade, and as such, per se
illegal. 161
2. Analysis
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the delay of Andrx's
entry into the market resulted in a bottleneck, which prevented other
generic competitors from entering the market. 162 Because Andrx was a
potential competitor of HMR, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that the Agreement not to enter the market was a naked,
horizontal agreement to eliminate competition. 163 The Sixth Circuit found
that HMR went beyond protecting the intellectual property right to exclude
granted by its patent because the Agreement actually bolstered the
effectiveness of the existing patent."16 The Sixth Circuit stated, "It is one
thing to take advantage of a monopoly that naturally arises from a patent,
but another thing altogether to bolster the patent's effectiveness in

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 903.
Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 904.
Id.
Id. at 905.
Id. at 907.
Id. at 905.
Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 908.
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inhibiting competitors by paying the only potential competitor $40 million
per year to stay out of the market."' 65
Therefore, the circuit court found the Agreement per se illegal and
granted summary judgment to the plaintiff.'66
3. Commentary
Settlement agreements like the one in Cardizem CDAntitrustLitigation
are referred to by economists as exit payments because they either prevent
the entry of a competitor or bribe a competitor to exit the market. 167 A true
"exit" payment by an incumbent firm represents sharing the incumbent
firm's monopoly profits with the prospective entrant in return for the
prospective entrant staying
out of the market, which preserves the
68
1
monopoly.
incumbent's
Looking at the problem from an economic point of view, the patent
monopoly is the goose that lays the golden eggs. The golden eggs are
referred to in economic terms as monopoly rents, which flow from a
169
monopolist's restriction on output and create deadweight social losses.
In the patent area, monopoly rents are often considered payments to the
patent holder for the high cost of research
and development that is
70
necessary for innovation to take place. 1
Some courts and commentators argue that settlement agreements have
redeeming pro-competitive aspects. 17' These commentators believe that the
patent systems should strike a balance between rewarding innovation and

165. Id.
166. Id. at 915.
167. Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement oflntellectualPropertyDisputes,
87 MINN. L. REv. 1719, 1749-60 (2003) (arguing for a rule of presumptive illegality for "exclusion
payments," where a patentee pays an infringement defendant on the condition that the defendant
not enter the market).
168. Daniel A. Crane, Exit Paymentsin Settlement ofPatentInfringementLawsuits: Antitrust
Rules andEconomicImplications, 54 FLA. L. REv. 747, 748 (2002) (discussing the anti-competitive
and pro-competitive aspects of exit payments).
169. Id.
170. Supra text accompanying note 13 (discussing research and development costs).
171. Crane, supra note 168, at 749. Crane argues that the voluntary settlement of disputes has
a corresponding social benefit because of the inefficiency and astronomical cost ofpatent litigation,
which will ultimately be passed on to consumers. Id. Crane identifies the interrelationship between
the pro-patent, pro-settlement, and anti-market division public policies of the laws that intersect in
patent settlements. Crane points out that the literature on patent settlements has not adequately
addressed the interplay among these legal theories. Id.
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minimizing the deadweight losses to society that result from the patent
monopoly.172

C. The Casefor a Return to the Rule of Reason. Valley Drug
1. Factual Background
Abbott Laboratories (Abbott) manufactures Hytrin, a brand name drug
17 3
for hypertension, with the active ingredient dehydrate terazosin HC.
Abbott's patent for terazosin HCl has expired, although Abbott holds
patents for other forms and uses of the drug.'7 4
Between 1993 and 1996, Geneva Pharmaceuticals (Geneva), a generic
manufacturer, submitted four ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications
based on Abbott's terazosin HCI patents.' 75 Abbott sued Geneva for patent
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e), invoking the 30-month stay of
FDA approval.176 Abbott's claim was based on Geneva's submission of an
ANDA for a tablet form of terazosin HCl, similar to a method of use
patent owned by Abbott.' 77 Geneva admitted that its tablet infringed
Abbott's patent, but claimed that Abbott's patent was invalid.17 In a
bizarre factual twist, it appears that through an oversight, Abbott neglected
to bring a patent infringement suit against Geneva for its use of a capsule
form of terazosin HC1 during the 45-day window.'7 9 Thus, Geneva's
ANDA for a terazosin HCl capsule was approved by the FDA in March

1998. 180
In June of 1994, Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals (Zenith), another
generic manufacturer, submitted an ANDA with Paragraph IV
certifications based on Abbott's terazosin HCl patents. 8 ' Abbott then latelisted two patents in May 1995 and April 1996, also based on terazosin
HC1. 8 2 Abbott demanded that Zenith amend its ANDA application to make
a certification regarding these new patents.8 3 Instead, Zenith made the

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 750.
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11 th Cir. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1298-99.
Id. at 1299.
Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1299.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1299.
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strategic move of suing Abbott for a preliminary injunction, hoping to
prevent a 30-month stay on approval." 4 Zenith was not granted a
preliminary injunction, and it appealed to the Federal Circuit. 85
On March 31, 1998, Abbott and Zenith entered into agreements (Zenith
Agreements) dismissing Zenith's delisting claims and Abbott's
infringement counterclaims. 8 6 Zenith agreed not to sell or distribute any
generic product containing terazosin HCl until another generic marketed
such a product or until Abbott's patent expired.'87 Zenith also agreed not
to sell its rights under the ANDA."88 In return, Abbott agreed to pay $3
million immediately, $3 million after three months, and $6 million every
three months thereafter until March
2000, or until the Zenith Agreements
189
terminated on their own terms.
On April 1, 1998, Abbott and Geneva entered into settlement
agreements (Geneva Agreements). 9 ° Geneva agreed not to sell or
distribute any generic product containing terazosin HCl until another
competitor introduced a generic version of the drug, Abbott's patent
expired, or Geneva obtained a final judgment that its terazosin tablets and
capsules did not infringe Abbott's patent.' 9' In return, Abbott agreed to pay
Geneva $4.5 million each month until a final judgment was entered or
192
another competitor brought a generic terazosin HCI product to market.
The district court ruled that Abbott's patent was invalid and the Federal
Circuit affirmed on July 1, 1999.193 Shortly afterward, on January 10,
2000, Abbott and Geneva terminated their agreement in response to FTC
investigations of the Geneva Agreements."
A class action lawsuit was filed pursuant to the Sherman Act, and the
District Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled that the
Agreements were a market allocation scheme that was illegal per se. "' The

184. Id. at 1299. See also Zenith Labs. v. Abbott Labs., No. 96-1661, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23954 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 1997).
185.

Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1299-1300.

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Valley Drug Co, 344 F.3d at 1300.
Id.
Id.

193. Id. at 1301.
194. Id.

195. See In re Terazosin Hyrdrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340-54 (S.D. Fla.
2000) (stating, "Geneva and Zenith foreswore competing with Abbott in the United States market
for terazosin hydrochloride drugs...").
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Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the Sherman Act claims de
Eleventh
96
novo. 1

In its review, the Eleventh Circuit commented that in holding the
Agreements per se unlawful, the district court had analyzed and rejected
the defense that the Agreements had a pro-competitive effect. 9 7 The
district court also rejected the defense that the Agreements were patent
litigation settlements, finding that the agreements did not resolve the
patent litigation. 198
2. Analysis
Market allocation agreements between competitors are clearly anticompetitive. 99 In United States v. Topco Associates, the U.S. Supreme
Court encountered the classic example of a market allocation agreement,
a collusive agreement between competitors to allocate territories in an
effort to diminish output and raise prices, dividing the higher profits.20 °
The present case is distinguishable in that one of the parties owned a
patent.20 1 In Dawson ChemicalCo. v. Rohm &Haas Co., the U.S. Supreme
Court stated that "the essence of the patent grant is the right to exclude
others from profiting by the patented invention. 20 2 The Eleventh Circuit
focused on the fact that this exclusionary right is granted as an incentive
to induce investment in innovation by allowing the innovator to exploit for
203
a time whatever degree of market power is derived from its ingenuity.
In Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, the Eastern
District of New York stated that "when patents are involved . . . the
exclusionary effect of the patent must be considered before making any
determination as to whether the alleged restraint is per se illegal. ' ' 2' The
court went on to express concern that a restrictive rule for patent
infringement settlements would impair incentives to innovate because it
would weaken the patent holder's defense against attack.20 5 In Justice
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

ValleyDrug Co., 344 F.3d at 1303.
Id. at 1302.
Id.
Id. at 1304.
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3dat 1304.
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,215 (1980), citedin Valley Drug

Co., 344 F.3d at 1304.
203.
489 U.S.
204.
2003).
205.

Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1304 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
141,150-51 (1989)).
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 249 (E.D.N.Y.
See id. at 256.
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Harlan's Walker Processconcurrence, he also expressed concern that a per
se rule "might well chill the disclosure of inventions through the obtaining
of a patent because of fear of the vexations or punitive consequences of
treble-damage suits."206

Looking to Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to flatly declare all brand
payments in patent litigation settlements per se illegal.20 7 The court
reasoned that "[t]he failure to produce the competing terazosin drug, rather
than the payment of money, is the exclusionary effect, and litigation is a
much more costly mechanism to achieve exclusion, both to the parties and
to the public, than is settlement. ' 202 This statement follows the logic of
recent antitrust cases, which have moved away from a categorical analysis
of complex agreements. 20 9 The court wanted to avoid a rule that would
chill patent litigation settlements and decrease the value of patent
protection, thereby diminishing the incentive for innovation.210
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals also disagreed with the Sixth
Circuit's statement that the settlement of litigation gave rise to an
inference of patent invalidity. 21' The court noted that in Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride,settlement agreements included $49.1 million for asserting
entry into the market,
the patent's validity, and $398 million for delayed
21 2
even though the patent was subsequently upheld.
In conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals took the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals to task, reasoning that "[w]hen the exclusionary
power of a patent is implicated, however, the antitrust analysis cannot
'
Finding that summary
ignore the scope of the patent exclusion."213
judgment as to the per se invalidity of the settlement agreements was
improper, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case for a
full and reasoned analysis of the agreements and their market effects under
the Sherman Act. 14 The court concluded:
The appropriate analysis on remand will likely require an
identification of the protection afforded by the patents and the
206. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 180 (1996)
(Harlan, J.,
concurring).
207. ValleyDrug Co., 344 F.3d at 1309.
208. Id.; see also Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976).
209. See supratext accompanying note 114.
210. ValleyDrug Co., 344 F.3d at 1309-10.
211. Id. at 1310.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1312-13.
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relevant law and consideration of the extent to which the
Agreements reflect a reasonable implementation of these.
Appellants, for example, contend that certain provisions of the
Geneva Agreement are analogous to a consensual preliminary
injunction and stay of judgment pending appeal. To evaluate this
claim, the provisions of this agreement should be compared to the
protections afforded by the preliminary injunction and stay
mechanisms and considered in light of the likelihood of Abbott's
obtaining such protections. Some care must be taken to ensure that
•.. the settlement . .. is not more anticompetitive than a likely
outcome of the litigation.2" 5
3. Commentary
The effect of Valley Drug is likely to result in a return to the rule of
reason for the analysis of patent infringement lawsuit settlements and other
agreements formed in light of intellectual property rights. In particular, it
signals a recognition of the patent holder's right to protect its intellectual
property and exclude others within the confines of the statutory grant. A
tension still exists between the FTC enforcement of these provisions and
the Commission's view that such agreements are per se illegal.
V. THE DIAGONAL RESTRAINT AND PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS

A. The MarketPlacefor Ideas
Agreements between brand name manufacturers and generic
manufacturers have a horizontal element because these two groups
compete against each other to secure market share. However, the generic
manufacturer relies on the brand name manufacturer's research and
development in submitting its ANDA. For this reason, a vertical element
exists in agreements between brand name and generic manufacturers.
In this context, the generic manufacturer is a user, akin to a licensee,
of the intellectual property produced by the brand name manufacturer. The
Hatch-Waxman Amendments attempt to resolve this conflict by allowing
the brand name manufacturer to sue for patent infringement and prevail if
the generic manufacturer has not added anything to the original patent
grant.

215. Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1312 (citations omitted).

PHARMACEUTICAL PA TENT SETTLEMENTS: FAULT LINES

B. The DiagonalRestraint
Because of the complexity of the relationship between these parties, an
agreement between them is a diagonal agreement. The generic
manufacturer is both dependent on the brand name manufacturer and its
competitor.
Brand Name Manufacturer (R & D)
A
- -----

Dependency Competition
j

Brand Generic Equivalent
Generic Equivalent

This new diagonal restraint results from the legislative premium placed
on giving consumers the maximum benefit of new research, while
affording them the option of obtaining cheaper substitutes by facilitating
generic competition. The artificial economics that are created require that
the brand name manufacturer be both protected from the erosion of his
patent rights, and regulated to ensure he does not exceed his patent rights.
As noted above, litigation settlements are not anti-competitive unless they
have anti-competitive effects which exceed the rights of the respective
parties. As has been shown throughout this Article, the proper legal
inquiry for this complex interrelationship in the pharmaceutical industry
(and other high tech areas), is a thorough rule of reason enquiry.
VI. CONCLUSION

Consumers have expressed their outrage at soaring prescription drug
prices and have pushed legislators to enact legislation allowing for
importation of cheaper Canadian drugs. Recent congressional action has
closed loopholes that existed under the previous Hatch-Waxman laws.
Most prominently, the Medicare Act has taken the stop out of the
bottleneck that has resulted from patent infringement settlements in the
past. Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court has moved away from a
categorical analysis of complex intellectual property agreements that
overlap with antitrust laws. With the fast pace of innovation and the
complexity of agreements formed in this new information age, courts have
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been more hesitant to rule on the validity of agreements without examining
their actual effects in the marketplace.
Given these developments, the U.S. Supreme Court will likely adopt
a rule of reason analysis for patent infringement lawsuits. The diagonal
nature of these restraints, encompassing aspects of both traditional
antitrust categories, requires a searching analysis. Application of this
standard of review balances the competing concerns of brand name
manufacturers, who need an incentive to undertake costly research and
development, and consumers who cannot afford to pay for the unchecked
monopolies that existed in the pharmaceutical industry before the HatchWaxman Act. The rule of reason will pave the way for a legal bridge
across the rift that has formed at the border of the intellectual property and
antitrust regimes.

